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Abstract 
The research set out to determine whether board activity impacts 
institutional performance. Secondary data for a ten-year period between 2006 
to 2015 from 98 sampled institutions from the financial sector was collected 
and analysed. The study adopted stratified sampling to ensure that all the 
categories of financial institutions were included in the sample. Analysis of 
the data was done by multiple regression analysis and generalized estimating 
equations. The study was anchored on several theories among them; the 
agency theory, stakeholder theory, and resource dependence theory. The 
findings are that board activity operationalised as the number of board 
meetings, significantly affect institutional performance. Additionally, the 
results further show that there exists an optimal number of board of director 
meetings with a statistical significant impact on institutional performance. 
11 to 15 board of directors’ meetings annualy were found to optimize 
institutional performance. The research findings will aid in managerial 
policy formulation and managerial practice that promote better governance 
practices hence leading to enhanced institutional performance. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The modern business environment is characterized by uncertainty, risk 
and dynamism, making it harder to forecast and manage factors, which are 
more likely to impact institutional performance (Sanda, Mikailu & Garba, 
2005). This research paper proposes that adoption of good corporate 
governance practices is among the most viable options of improving 
institutional performance, and mitigating uncertainty and risk in a modern 
corporate environment. Moreover, it increases the possibility of getting 
additional investment capital due to reduced risk levels. Adoption of good 
corporate governance systems were necessitated by the agency conflicts which 
have become an integral part of the modern-day corporation, and increased 
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owner emphasis on short-term performance and return outcomes (Sanda et al., 
2005).  
Corporate scandals in Kenya experienced by firms such as: Imperial 
Bank, Chase Bank, Dubai Bank, Uchumi Ltd, Mumias Sugar Company Ltd, 
CMC Ltd and East Africa Portland Ltd and outside Kenya such as Enron, 
WorldCom and HIH, questions the ability of the board of directors (BoDs) in 
executing its monitoring role. Geneen (1984) found out that 95% of the BoD 
of some 500 fortune companies, were not complying with legal requirements 
as expected of them. Geneen (1984) argues that the BoD is a puppet of 
management because of CEO dominance.  They also concluded that the board 
is beleaguered with a lot of conflicts of interests’ issues.  Furthermore, 
interests of a controlling shareholder greatly influence the Board’s decisions 
(Jesover & Krikpatrick, 2005). Hence the primary question of monitoring the 
board: who will monitor the monitors? The BoD and by extension how the 
board is structured consequently, is likely to be an important driver of 
institutional performance. A number of studies argue that shareholders 
monitor the BoD by exercising their ownership right to elect or dismiss 
members of BoDs.  However, shareholders are not necessarily aware of the 
firm’s routine internal activities.  
Researchers report mixed and contradictory results about the optimal 
board structure (Dalton et al., 1998). However, there appears to be agreement 
on the important variables representing board structure and that may have an 
impact on the monitoring and thus performance. The debate about influence 
of board structure on the performance of institutions continues, given that prior 
research has yielded conflicting results (Dalton et al., 1998) suggesting that 
other factors mediate or intervene to the acceleration of the relationship. 
Dalton et al. (1998) identifies ownership concentration as one of the factors 
that are likely to mediate or intervene in the relationship. Additionally, firm 
characteristics and CEO tenure could be some of the factors that come into 
play. A number of studies have established negative relationship among the 
CEO turnover, CEO tenure, and firms’ performance (Murphy & Zimmerman, 
1993; Weisbach, 1988).  
Five key characteristics of board structure have received attention in 
several studies, these variables include, board size, board composition, board 
diversity, CEO duality and number of board meetings. Most researchers agree 
with the conclusion that board structure variables are exogenously determined 
(Eisenberg et.al., 1998), Yermack, 1996; and Jensen, 1993).  Some of the 
notable studies include that of Mak and Kusnadi (2002) who concluded that 
the smaller the board size, the higher the institutional value. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985), Mehran (1995), and Klein (1998) on the other hand, show that 
institutional performance was not significantly associated with a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board.  Vafeas (1999) as well as 
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Adams and Ferreira (2004) were of the view that frequent board meetings 
contributed to improved institutional performance. Wah et al. (2015) found 
that board diversity as measured by the number of female members of the BoD 
has a significant positive influence on institutional performance. Prior studies 
on CEO duality found mixed evidence. Yermack (1996) argued that 
performance is optimized when CEO duality exists, while Daily and Dalton 
(1992) report absence of association between CEO duality and institutional 
performance. A number of studies both theoretical and empirical agree that 
board structure variables differ in relation to the institutional characteristics 
(Boone, et al., 2005; Adams, 2005; Baker & Gompers, 2003; Lehn et. al., 
2003; and Hartzell & Starks 2003,). Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) were of 
the view that there is empirical review on the determinants of an optimal 
structure of the board or the factors that influence an optimal board size is 
scanty. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that empirical studies 
conceptualized along the influence of either board structure or board activity 
on institutional performance in developing countries are rare. Prior research 
on various corporate governance variables has been within the context of 
developed countries (e.g., Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Wintoki et al.  2012). 
Of importance is that a number of institutional factors regarding developing 
countries are quite different and hence, this research moves to a new setting, 
and reviews the influence board activity on institutional performance in a 
developing economy. 
Prior empirical research on board structure and institutional 
performance have demonstrated that the relationship is quite equivocal and 
does not reveal any conclusive relationship (Dalton & Daily, 1999). Board 
structure variables explored include size, diversity, CEO duality, busyness and 
independence among others. However, no evidence has been found that board 
activity as defined in this study has been used as a variable in the current 
context. The question remains as to the casual association among these 
variables.  
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research was to establish whether an association 
exists among board activity and performance of financial institutions in 
Kenya. It also sought to determine whether there exists an optimal number of 
the board meetings that would optimise performance. 
 
2.0 Empirical Review 
2.1 Board Activity  
 The BoD is the most significant corporate governance structure in all 
institutions (Lim, 2010). The way the board is characterised impacts the 
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strategic decisions, including how resources are allocated and thus ultimately 
affect profitability (Mallin, 2010; OECD, 1999). In addition to providing 
strategic direction, the BoD also undertakes the major monitoring function 
which addresses the agency problem within the institution (Fama, 1980). 
However, the BoD is not the only remedy to all the governance problems 
within corporations in modern times (Ongore, 2011). To take cognizant of the 
corporate governance problems, institutions are required to further factor risk-
taking orientations of their equity holders who affect managerial decisions 
regarding investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  
Board activity maybe defined as the number and frequency of events 
and or meetings that require the engagement of the entire board of directors. 
Different approaches can be used to define this perspective. One considers the 
board meetings only while other approaches focus on all meetings and events 
that require the board members participation. Board process is characterized 
by decision-making activities among the board members of institutions. 
Many empirical studies agree that directors’ equity shares ownership 
increases institutional performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Chung & Pruitt, 
1996; Palia & Lichtenberg, 1999). Brickley et al. (1988) were of the view that 
ownership of shares by the board leads to effective management of the firm 
and proper checks on managers. However, other researchers have not agreed 
about the relation between managers equity share ownership and institutional 
performance. De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) in agreement with the agency 
theory, stated that substantial equity share ownership by the management 
makes it more difficult to institute management changes hence resulting in 
agency conflict. Morck et al. (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) foresee 
the possibility of managers taking advantage of the corporate for their own 
benefit. Becht et al., (2005) from their study were of the view that CEO equity 
share ownership makes them take advantage of their positions to benefit 
financially at the expense of other equity holders. Other empirical studies have 
come to the conclusion that equity share ownership by management is 
endogenic (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Loderer & Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998). 
Various studies about the size of the board have produced equivocal 
results (Johl. 2015; Kajola, 2008; Barako et al., 2006). Most studies debating, 
from several viewpoints, do not agree on the board size (Jensen 1993). A 
number of empirical studies are in support of small board size arguing that this 
enhances the institutional performance (e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen 
1993; Yermack, 1996) however, others support the notion that big boards are 
more ideal because they positively impact on performance (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Klein, 1998; Coles et al., 2008). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) were in support of 
smaller boards arguing that they would help the institution to avoid social 
loafing and free-riding. Jensen (1993) added that smaller boards usually eased 
co-ordination, cohesiveness and communication. This matches O’Reilly et al. 
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(1989) view, which declared that with the increase in board size, the 
effectiveness of interpersonal communication decreases, and coordination 
problems seem to be obvious, which would most probably develop factions 
and conflicts. Furthermore, earlier studies; Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) concluded that small boards resulted in increased firm performance. 
Larger boards were deemed efficient because of its association with 
proper monitoring of the management activities and advisory role to the CEO 
(Adam & Mehran, 2003; Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972).  Klein (1998) concluded 
that complexity of an institution enhances the CEO’s need for guidance from 
the board. It is worth noting that the agency theory is in support of larger 
boards for their monitoring effectiveness which emanates from reducing the 
CEO’s hold on the board and protecting the equity holders from exploitation 
(Singh & Harianto, 1989). 
Various researchers have attempted to explain the contradictory 
relationship among board structure variables and institutional performance.  
Nonetheless, the performance level attributed to a given board structure has 
not been clearly established (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Dalton and 
Daily (1999) concluded that several decades of empirical review aimed at 
establishing the association among board structure and institutional 
performance have been inconclusive. 
 
2.2 Institutional Performance  
Firm performance is an imperative idea that describes the means and 
ways through which organizational resources are employed to achieve 
corporate strategy. It keeps the organization a float and brings about better 
vision for future opportunities (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Performance of the 
firm relates to its efficiency, effectiveness, financial viability and relevance. 
Effectiveness brings out the peculiar abilities which organizations must 
embrace in ensuring attainment of their missions.  Efficiency is described as 
the unit cost of output which is much less than the input leaving no alternative 
option through which the input can be reduced for the same amount of output 
(Machuki & Aosa, 2011). Financial viability on the other hand has been 
defined as a firm’s ability to harness its financial resources which are its inflow 
of financial resources that must be greater than the outflow. Relevance is the 
ability of a firm to develop in ways that consolidate their strengths. Ricardo et 
al. (2001) defines performance as the ability of a firm to maximize strengths 
to overcome its weaknesses to neutralize its threats and take advantages of 
opportunities. 
Performance measurement is characterized by measurement 
difficulties. While the study has zeroed in on performance, some scholars have 
expressed concern that the field has yielded inconclusive results, often 
drawing ‘‘seemingly conflicting findings’’ regarding the determinants of 
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performance. Awino (2011) concludes that no single variable can effectively 
influence a firm’s performance. Performance measures are many and varied 
with some schools of thought advocating for financial performance measures 
and others for the non-financial performance measures. Not a single measure 
of performance can completely explain all aspects of the term due to 
organizational objectives and contextual factors (Snow & Hambrick, 1980). 
This may be partly because definition of performance incorporates efficiency-
related measures, relating to the input/output models and effectiveness related 
measures, dealing with issues such as growth, employee satisfaction, 
commitment, and turnover (Mayer & Schoorman, 1992; Machuki & Aosa, 
2011). Sometimes, performance is conceptually confused with productivity. 
Productivity is defined as a ratio which depicts the volume of work completed 
within a defined period of time.  Performance is therefore broader, and 
productivity is one of its indicators (Ricardo, 2001). 
Firm performance usually represents the quality of the firm’s on-going 
relationship with the environment. It can be represented by growth, 
profitability, and other non-financial indicators. Firm performance depends on 
the context and incorporates indicators in multiple analysis levels (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992). While its description refers to a particular point in time, 
development, periodic change and varied time scales will need to be 
considered. Static efficiency may lead to instability in the long run and a 
temporary misfit could be required to attain long-term dynamic fit. Due to this, 
incompatible short-term and long-term alliances need to be sorted out in firm 
performance. It also needs to show how a firm is effectively exploiting 
available resources while generating new ones. 
Firm performance may also be said to be a multi-dimensional construct 
(Chakravathy, 1986); which a single index may not necessarily be able to give 
a detailed understanding of relationship compared to the particular construct 
of interest. Different performance measures exist including both long-term and 
short-term market performance measures. Studies document several measures 
that have been used to varying extent including market value added (MVA), 
return on assets (ROA), economic value added (EVA), free cash flow 
enhancement, earnings per share (EPS) enhancement, asset enhancement, 
dividend enhancement, and revenue enhancement (Abdullah, 2004). For 
instance, Dehaene et al. (2001) adopted return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA) as measures of firms’ performance and concluded that this was 
effective in providing adequate performance information while Chen et al. 
(2005) suggested that market related measures were better and thus used the 
market-to-book ratio in their study of firms. Hong Kong. Judge et al. (2003) 
used several indicators which included both quantitative and qualitative 
measures such as profitability, customer satisfaction, product/service quality, 
capacity optimisation and business process enhancement in assessment of 
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institutional performance. Firm performance remains a challenging concept 
both in terms of how it should be defined and measured because of its 
multifaceted and multidimensional nature. Most studies of firm performance 
posit that performance is a dependent variable and seek to identify variables 
that explain variation in terms of performance.  
Ocasio, 1994 and Hoskisson et al., 1994 find that accounting-based 
financial measures, market-based measures including combinations of both 
have been relied upon in most studies which focus on the association among 
corporate governance and profitability of an institution. Accounting based 
performance indicators of the firm rely on accounting ratios that do not 
incorporate the stock market variables while measures that are based on 
market variables include the Tobins Q and return on the market which 
incorporate the stock price. Financial accounting measures despite having 
been criticized many times have been relied on by many studies. The criticism 
emanates from the fact that such measures (1) can aid in creative accounting 
through, manipulating accounting information; (2) may likely devalue assets; 
(3) generate biases as a result of accounting policies and methods adopted by 
the firm; and (4) lack standardization in financial reporting as some 
jurisdictions have not adopted international financial reporting standards. 
Also, interpretation of financial accounting statements and ratios is subjective 
in case of cross cutting industry participation by the various firms (Nayyar, 
1992) or where the firm’s ownership structures are varied.  
In contrast, market-based measures have several benefits. Risk 
adjusted performance measurement is reflected in these indicators; they are 
not negatively impacted upon by cross cutting industry or multinational 
contexts (Nayyar, 1992). Deckop, 1987 concludes that the main reason for this 
is that market-based performance indicators are in control of external forces 
and not within the management’s control. Literature does not document any 
consensus concerning the efficacy of dependence on either accounting-based 
indicators or market-based indicators, many studies have resorted to using a 
mix of the financial performance measures. 
 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Research Design, Data and Sampling  
The study was a descriptive correlational survey. Using data from a 
developing country, Kenya, the research sought to determine the relationship 
between board activity and institutional performance. The data was collected 
for a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015 for the institutions that were sampled 
from the financial sector in Kenya, through data collection sheets from annual 
reports and company websites. The population comprised of all financial 
institutions in Kenya being 3989 institutions. This composed of five 
regulators, 43 commercial banks, 10 Investment banks, two development 
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banks and one mortgage finance company, 41 insurance companies, nine 
deposit taking micro-finance institutions, and 3,887 Sacco’s 
(http://www.centralbank.go.ke). The study followed the simple stratified 
random sampling in obtaining viable set of data sets and sampled 98 firms 
from all the categories. The data collected composed of the number of 
meetings and or events requiring the board participation held by each of the 
sampled institution annually. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
The data collected was prepared, coded, analysed, organized and used 
to report the findings as well as results of tests of hypotheses. In getting the 
data ready for analysis, data editing, standardization, coding and 
categorization was undertaken. Descriptive statistics which included measures 
of central tendency were computed. Standard deviation was adopted to explore 
dispersion in the collected data. In addition, coefficient of variation, kurtosis 
and skewness were also computed, for confirming normality of the data. All 
the variables of the research were described, and the salient characteristics of 
the data collected provided, this enabled the researcher to conduct further data 
analyses (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). 
 Moderated and stepwise regression models and correlation analysis 
were used to determine the relationship between board activity and 
institutional performance using ROA and Sales growth. A number of variables 
were denoted in logarithm form since they were measured in millions while 
others were denoted as percentages where the values were also high and the 
remaining as absolute numbers. The usage of logarithm was to enhance 
standardization of values in the model. 
Multiple regression analysis was used in analysis of the collected data. 
Parametric and non-parametric methodologies were used. Tests of goodness 
of fit including the adjusted coefficient of determination (?̅? 2), t-tests, standard 
error of estimate (Se) and ANOVA were also done. The regression was 
performed in the form of a panel; several panel regression options, fixed 
effects, random effects, OLS, generalized squares (GLS), and panel that is 
dynamic were performed. Because OLS makes no use of the information 
contained in the unequal variability exhibited by the predictor and to ensure 
that the analysis produces the best linear estimators GLS has also been used. 
The General Estimation Equation (GEE) procedure has been used to extend 
the generalized linear model (GLM) to allow for repeat measurements. This 
allowed analysis of the variables of the study over the ten-year period in the 
research. 
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4.0 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
    Performance of financial institutions in Kenya was the dependent 
variable of this study. The indicators of performance were ROA and Revenue 
Growth Rate. These performance indicators had been used for similar studies 
by Yammeesri and Lodh (2004), Johl et.al. (2015), Yammeesri et al. (2006), 
Rashid and Lodh (2008). ROA was computed as the Earnings before Interest 
and Taxes (EBIT) divided by the book value of total assets. In Table 4.1 below 
are the descriptive statistics.   
    The maximum ROA for the financial institutions sampled was 24.9, 
25.99 and 21.38 for Banks, Insurance and Saccos respectively (see Table 4.6). 
Commercial banks exhibit the largest asset base, compared to the other 
categories of financial institutions, but when it comes to performance (ROA), 
it is ranked second. The minimum ROA was -15.55, 3.84 and 8.48 for Banks, 
Insurance and Saccos respectively; while the average ROA from Banks, 
Insurances and Saccos were 3.20, 6.83 and 2.64 respectively. Half the ROA for 
Banks, Insurance and Saccos are less than or equal to 3.20, 6.07 and 1.72 
respectively whereas their respective ranges in ROA are 40.45, 29.83 and 
29.85. From skewness, the study observed that the average scores of all the 
firm performance constructs are positively skewed and is very near to zero, 
which clarified that the constructs are asymmetrical. Kurtosis values indicated 
that all the sub constructs have platy-kurtic distribution, and it is concluded that 
they are normally distributed. 
    Descriptive statistics was also carried out for growth in revenue 
being the other firm performance measure. The results show that the maximum 
and minimum number of growth in revenue for Banks, Insurances and Saccos 
are 35.99, 56.65 and 47.52 and -6.14, -23.56 and -20.90 respectively. The 
average growth in sales for Banks, Insurance and Saccos are 14.19, 19.12 and 
16.52 respectively, whereas their corresponding medians are 13.50, 17.32 and 
15.33 indicating that the means are not very far from their respective medians 
implying that they follow a normal distribution and thus allowed for correlation 
and regression analysis to be undertaken. Additionally, growth in EBIT was 
analyzed and the results in table 4.6 above show that, the maximum and 
minimum number of Growth of EBIT in Banks, Insurances and Saccos are 
40.78, 38.90, 53.43 and -14.37, -9.83, -11 respectively. The results also indicate 
that the respective means and medians are 14.26, 13.13 and 19.25 for Banks, 
Insurances and Saccos respectively.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Firm Performance 
  Mean 95% Confidence 
Interval 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean 
Median Variance Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Range Interquartile 
Range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
   Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
          
ROA 
Bank 
Statistic 3.205 2.809 3.600 3.145 3.207 10.443 3.231 -15.548 24.908 40.456 2.8622 1.419 20.264 
Std. Error 0.200             
ROA 
Insurance 
Statistic 6.831 6.238 7.424 6.588 6.075 21.726 4.661 -3.838 25.990 29.829 5.9428 0.928 1.649 
Std. Error 0.300           0.157 0.313 
ROA 
Sacco 
Statistic 2.637 2.291 2.984 2.328 1.719 8.995 2.999 -8.479 21.3785 29.8582 2.3137 2.086 8.973 
Std. Error 0.176           0.143 0.285 
Growth of  
EBIT 
Statistic 16.610 15.633 17.587 16.677 16.515 195.496 13.981 -14.571 53.4332 68.0050 18.8570 -0.046 -0.338 
Std. Error 0.497           0.087 0.174 
Growth of  
Sales 
Statistic 16.548 15.518 17.578 16.751 15.684 217.219 14.738 -23.556 56.6533 80.2098 80.2098 -0.055 0.661 
Std. Error 0.524           0.087 0.174 
 
 
   Mean 95% Confidence 
Interval 
5% 
Trimmed 
Mean 
Median Variance Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Range Interquartile 
Range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
    Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
          
 
 
 
 
Growth of 
EBIT 
Bank Statistic 14.89 13.02 16.76 15.096 14.259 233.541 15.282 -14.5718 40.7802 55.3520 25.2134 -0.155 -1.104 
Std. Error 0.949           0.151 0.302 
Insurance Statistic 14.89 13.24 16.55 14.885 13.132 169.166 13.006 -9.8314 38.8980 48.7294 17.0886 0.196 -0.526 
Std. Error 0.839           0.157 0.313 
Sacco Statistic 19.56 18.04 21.07 19.612 19.252 170.856 13.071 -11.0044 53.4332 64.4376 17.2052 0.027 0.809 
Std. Error 0.767           0.143 0.285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth of 
Sales 
Bank Statistic 14.19 12.84 15.53 14.069 13.495 121.568 11.025 -6.1423 35.9907 42.1331 18.6541 0.292 -0.890 
Std. Error 0.685           0.151 0.302 
Insurance Statistic 19.12 16.73 21.52 19.511 17.332 354.415 18.825 -23.556 56.6533 80.2098 19.4190 -0.391 0.146 
Std. Error 1.215           0.157 0.313 
Sacco Statistic 16.52 14.96 18.07 16.714 15.332 180.151 13.422 -20.901 47.5165 68.4178 9.5513 -0.072 1.013 
Std. Error 0.788           0.143 0.285 
Author, 2017 
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4.2 Generalized Estimating Equations 
   The procedure for Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) was 
applied in extending the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) to enable the 
researcher to analyze repeated data measurements. The GLM repeated data 
measures technique affords examination of variance in cases where similar 
measurements are done several times on each subject or case.  For instance, 
ROA was measured for 10 years in this study. By adopting the general linear 
model technique, the study tested the hypotheses regarding influence of both 
the between-subjects elements and the within-subjects elements. These 
explored relationships among elements in addition to influence of individual 
elements. Furthermore, the influence of constant covariates and covariate 
interactions with the between-subjects elements were included. The GLM 
repeated measures technique enabled the researcher to determine the values of 
multiple dependent scale variables obtained at multiple time periods, based on 
their association to categorical and scale independent variables and the time 
periods at which they were obtained. This section presents the result of how 
ROA depend on gender diversity of boards and board composition using the 
GEE procedure. The model information table 1 below summarizes the section 
on modelling selection to ensure that the procedure fits the appropriate model. 
Table 1: Model Information 
Dependent Variable Return on Assets 
Probability Distribution Normal 
Link Function Identity 
Subject Effect 1 Name 
Within-Subject Effect 1 Year 
Working Correlation Matrix Structure Unstructured 
Author, 2017 
 
The Normal Probability Distribution (NPD) is appropriate since return 
on total asset is a scale variable and its values take a symmetric, bell-shaped 
distribution about a central (mean) value. The link function is an alteration of 
the dependent variable that permits prediction of the model. The following link 
function which can also be used with any distribution is used – Identity, f(x) = 
x. The dependent variable is not altered.  
The name captures the names of the firms in this study, which are the 
main subjects of the study. The year captures the within subject data. The 
working correlation matrix is a representative of the within-subject 
dependencies. The size is indicated by the number of observations and thus the 
amalgamation of values of within-subject variables. There are five possible 
structures: Independent which assumes that repeated observations are 
uncorrelated; AR (1) in which it is assumed that repeated observations have a 
first-order autoregressive association and that the correlation among any two 
elements is equal to r for adjacent elements, r2 for elements that are separated 
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by a third, and so on. r is constrained so that –1<r<1; Exchangeable which 
assumed that the structure has homogenous correlations between elements, it 
is also known as a compound symmetry structure; M-dependent in which it is 
assumed that consecutive observations have a common correlation coefficient. 
Greater separation among observations leads to the assumption that they are 
uncorrelated; unstructured, which is a completely general correlation matrix 
(help ibm.spss.statistics, 2017). The Working Correlation Matrix Structure 
with the best result, based on the data in this study is unstructured. The other 
structure does not tell much. The results are presented in section 4.1, in 
summary the results indicate that board activity operationalized through the 
number of board meetings significantly affects firm performance. 
 
4.2 Board Activity and Institutional Performance 
  The first objective of the research assessed the influence of board 
activity on Kenyan financial institution's performance. The research predicted 
that there was no significant influence of board activity on the institution's 
performance. Performance was measured through ROA and revenue growth 
for each institution. To assess if the board activity variable (NBMeet/BA) did 
not significantly predict ROA and Revenue growth of financial institutions in 
Kenya, the researcher applied hierarchical multiple regression analysis. This 
was the test of the first hypothesis and the sub hypotheses as shown below: 
Ho1: There is no significant effect of board activity on performance of 
financial institutions in Kenya. 
The prediction equations is as shown below; 
ROAi,t=α+β1BAi,t+εi,t. and RGRi,t=α+β1BAi,t+ εi,t. 
  The GEE results for firm performance and board activity 
operationalized through ROA and the categories of the number of board 
meetings (NBMeet or BA) and other activities respectively are presented in 
table 4.2 to 4.6 below. The number of board meetings operationalised as 
NBMeet was categorised in four classes (0 to 3) as per table 4.2 which also 
presents the percentages of firms that held that particular number of meetings 
per category.  
Table 4.2: Categorical Variable Information 
 N Percent 
Factor 
Categories Of Number of 
Board meetings and other 
activities 
1 to 6 Meetings in a 
Year 
420 53.2% 
7 to 10 Meetings in a 
Year 
60 7.6% 
11 to 15 Board Meetings 
in a Year 
121 15.3% 
16 to 27 Meetings in a 
Year 
189 23.9% 
Total 790 100.0% 
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Table 4.3: Goodness of Fita 
  Value 
Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QIC)b 17849.223 
Corrected Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion 
(QICC)b  
17781.282 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets          a. Information criteria are in small-is-better 
form. 
Model: (Intercept), NBMeetCla                                b. Computed using the full log quasi-
likelihood function 
 
 
Table 4.4: Tests of Model Effects & Parameter Estimates 
Source Type III 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 64.355 1 .000 
NBMeetCla 26.457 3 .000 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
Df Sig. 
(Intercept) -.855 .9830 -2.782 1.072 .756 1 .384 
[NBMeetCla=0] 5.264 1.1244 3.060 7.468 21.917 1 .000 
[NBMeetCla=1] 4.765 1.2014 2.411 7.120 15.735 1 .000 
[NBMeetCla=2] 7.908 1.8054 4.370 11.447 19.186 1 .000 
[NBMeetCla=3] 0a . . . . . . 
(Scale) 22.612       
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets 
Model: (Intercept), NBMeetCla a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
Table 4.5: Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Categories Of Number of board 
meetings and other activities 
Mean Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Upper 
1 to 6 Meetings in a Year 4.409169 .5458838 3.339256 5.479081 
7 to 10 Meetings in a Year 3.910531 .6905976 2.556984 5.264077 
11 to 15 Board Meetings in a Year 7.053296 1.3833166 4.342046 9.764547 
16 to 27 Meetings in a Year -.854926 .9830387 -2.781647 1.071794 
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Table 4.6: Working Correlation Matrix 
Measurement 
Measurement 
[ 
Year 
= 
2006 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2007 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2008 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2009 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2010 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2011] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2012 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2013 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2014 
] 
[ 
Year 
= 
2015] 
[ Year = 2006 
] 
1.000 .916 .916 .796 .674 .437 .517 .484 .501 .482 
[ Year = 2007 
] 
.916 1.000 .916 .835 .744 .526 .585 .667 .604 .566 
[ Year = 2008 
] 
.916 .916 1.000 .848 .668 .504 .544 .670 .526 .541 
[ Year = 2009 
] 
.796 .835 .848 1.000 .652 .451 .569 .702 .551 .560 
[ Year = 2010 
] 
.674 .744 .668 .652 1.000 .511 .623 .684 .524 .534 
[ Year = 2011 
] 
.437 .526 .504 .451 .511 1.000 .553 .566 .436 .443 
[ Year = 2012] .517 .585 .544 .569 .623 .553 1.000 .732 .556 .582 
[ Year = 2013] .484 .667 .670 .702 .684 .566 .732 1.000 .722 .819 
[ Year = 2014] .501 .604 .526 .551 .524 .436 .556 .722 1.000 .624 
[ Year = 2015] .482 .566 .541 .560 .534 .443 .582 .819 .624 1.000 
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets 
Model: (Intercept), NBMeetCla                                                                                                                         
Author, 2017 
In Table 4.2 are the results for the four categories of board activity, 
measured in terms of board meeting.  The categories of board meetings were 
as follows: firms that held 1 to 6 board meeting a year (53.2%), firm that held 
7 to 10 board meetings a year (7.6%), firm that held 11 to 15 board meetings a 
year (15.3%) and firm that held 16 to 27 board meetings a year (23.9%). The 
data in Table 4.3 shows that the unstructured correlation structure provides a 
better model and therefore, is used throughout this section. The results in Table 
4.4 showed the reference category for the number of board meetings is 
NBMeetCla=3; that is, firms with 16 to 27 board meetings in a year; and the 
value of 7.908 for NBMeetCla=2 means that, all other things being equal, we 
would expect the ROA of firms with 11 to 15 board meetings to be 7.908 higher 
than firms categorized as NBMeetCla=3; and the value of 4.765 for 
NBMeetCla=1 means that, all other things being equal, we would expect the 
ROA of firms with 7 to 10 board meetings to be 4.765 higher than firms 
categorized as NBMeetCla=0. The relationships are statistically significant 
indicating that board activity influences firm performance. Overall the findings 
provide evidence that there is an optimal number of board meetings that firm 
performance is optimized. Table 4.5 shows that the mean ROA is highest for 
firms with 11 to 15 board meetings in a year with mean ROA of 7.05%, for 7 
to 10 meetings, the mean is 3.9%, 1 to 6 meetings are 4.4% and for 16 to 27 
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meetings the mean ROA is -0.85% indicating that very high meetings 
negatively impact performance. This means that board activity is a predictor of 
performance as measured by ROA. Table 4.6 indicate that there is no 
information in the history as years 2006 and 2015 have very low correlation, 
the correlation decreases as the gap for the years increase. 
 The study hypothesized that board activity does not significantly affect 
institutional performance. The findings from hierarchical multiple regressions 
provide evidence that there is a significant effect of board activity on 
institutional performance. The findings also provide evidence that 11 to 15 
board of directors’ meetings annualy optimize institutional performance. 
 
5.0 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 Three data analysis methods were applied on the data collected to 
achieve the research objectives. The data analysis methods used included 
correlation analysis, generalized estimating equations (GEE) and variants of 
regression analysis. The result provided by the three data analysis methods was 
to confirm the influence of board activity on performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya; 
 The findings agree with the agency theory and the convergence-of-
interests theory. The study findings additionally indicate that there is an 
optimal number of board of director meetings that have a statistically 
significant influence on institutional performance. 11 to 15 board of 
directors’ meetings annualy were found to optimize institutional 
performance. In support of the convergence-of-interests theory board 
activity, particularly because of equity ownership is found to significantly 
impact institutional performance. This finding could be attributed to the fact 
that agency conflict can be resolved by encouraging management share 
options so as to align the interest of employees and directors with those of the 
equity holders; and the convergence-of-interests theory, which postulates that 
when board of directors had no equity ownership, they are self-oriented, but 
they have little power to circumvent firm controls that have been developed 
to align their decision making for the benefit of the residual owners. This was 
consistent with extant literature; however, whose results have been mixed, 
vexing and contradictory. Jointly, the individual contribution of each board 
structure variable had a significant influence on performance. 
Prevoius research has postulated that corporate governance is 
critical to institutional performance. Board activity has also been 
associated with institutional performance. Nonetheless,  scanty empirical 
review is available on the impact of board activity on institutional 
performance in emerging economies. This research sought to determine this 
association. The research findings will arouse deeper academic discourse 
on the association of these variables; form a basis for developing policy 
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as well as managerial practice in performance of institutions in Kenya and 
beyond. 
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